[CC Column] Ambition, Coherence and the Ability to Achieve: The Strategic Triangle for Korea’s 2035 NDC and Its Climate-Energy Future > 게시글

 

Choi Jai-chul, Chairman, Climate Change Center

 

 

 

In 2025, the Republic of Korea will embark on a new chapter of national governance as a new administration takes office without a traditional transition committee. Amid growing uncertainty across political, economic, and social spheres, climate and energy policy faces especially complex challenges, compounded by international pressure, the pace of technological innovation, and varying levels of industrial readiness. In this context, the formulation of Korea’s 2035 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) represents more than the next emissions reduction target—it is a critical juncture and opportunity to redesign the foundation of a Korean transition strategy.

 

 

1. Ambition, Coherence, and Feasibility: The Strategic Triangle for Carbon Neutrality
Responding to the climate crisis is no longer confined to environmental policy. It has evolved into a structural transformation challenge encompassing the entirety of Korea’s industrial and energy systems. Under Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, all Parties are required to submit updated NDCs by 2025, with a clear expectation of progression—not simply numerical updates, but enhanced ambition. Korea’s 2035 NDC must both meet these global expectations and be aligned with the nation’s internal implementation framework.

 

Ambition must not be judged solely by the magnitude of the reduction target. What matters more is the scientific credibility of the pathway to achieving it, and the robustness of sector-specific implementation strategies. This requires an objective assessment of Korea’s progress under the 2030 NDC, ensuring that reductions are attributable to structural transformation—not temporary economic downturns. For high-emissions industries such as steel, petrochemicals, and cement, Korea must invest in the demonstration and commercialization of homegrown technologies like hydrogen-based steelmaking and carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS), ensuring they can compete globally.

 

NDCs must not be treated as isolated figures but as integral components of national transition strategies, grounded in policy coherence and institutional consistency. The 2035 NDC must be strategically linked to midterm milestones in 2040 and 2045, and be harmonized with policy tools such as the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), carbon taxation, industrial restructuring, and electricity market reform. Yet the current governance structure, with responsibilities fragmented across ministries—Industry, Environment, Land and Transport, and Finance—makes integrated roadmaps difficult to implement. Enhancing the role of a centralized coordinating body and establishing mechanisms to reconcile inter-agency conflicts are critical to improving policy effectiveness.

 

Even the most ambitious targets are meaningless without the capacity to deliver. Feasibility must consider more than technology and finance—it requires institutional readiness, the appropriate allocation of budget and human resources, technology maturity, and public acceptability. Above all, a robust and accountable implementation system must be established. When public trust underpins policy execution, goals shift from political declarations to achievable commitments.

 

 

 

2. Aligning Global Trends with Domestic Realities: Korea’s Governance Choices
Climate and energy policy always operates within the boundaries of institutional frameworks. France has restructured its administration to coordinate climate and energy functions across the Ministry of Industry, a dedicated Ministry for Ecological Transition, and a Prime Ministerial climate committee. Germany has separated its climate and energy ministries while working to streamline overlapping functions. In contrast, the UK and Denmark have concentrated authority under energy ministries, ensuring policy continuity and coherence.

 

These governance models from advanced economies offer a clear message: the effectiveness of climate policy depends on how strategically, flexibly, and cohesively the system is designed. In Korea, core responsibilities are split across multiple ministries, yet strategic coordination remains weak. Since emissions reduction and energy transition affect not just the environment but also the economy, technology, labor, and industry, a high-level coordinating mechanism is urgently needed.

 

There have been calls to establish a new Ministry of Climate and Economy or a Presidential Office for Climate Policy. Proposals to strengthen local autonomy, enhance the role of subnational governments, and create an independent evaluation body are gaining traction. The incoming administration should prioritize building an effective implementation framework that ensures policy consistency and interlinkages between central and local governments, and between public and private sectors—not merely reshuffling organizational charts.

 

 

 

3. Challenges and Opportunities for Korea’s Next Administration
The administration taking office in 2025 will face compounded challenges: global and domestic instability, energy security concerns, and accelerating demands for decarbonization. Within this complex context, climate and energy policy can become either a political liability—centered on costs and burdens—or a strategic catalyst for innovation, investment, and competitiveness. The strengthening of frameworks such as RE100, the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and international green finance standards underscores that climate policy now directly impacts Korea’s export competitiveness.

Thus, the 2035 NDC must not be viewed as merely a diplomatic submission to the UNFCCC. It must serve as a strategic declaration that Korea’s industrial and energy systems are moving toward sustainable transformation. In this process, building policy credibility, incentivizing private-sector investment, and securing public support will be the cornerstones of leadership.

 

The Climate Change Center will continue to act as a bridge between science and policy, between ambition and practicality—offering strategic recommendations for viable transition pathways. Our recent policy dialogue, “Climate and Energy Strategy for Korea’s New Government: Ambition, Coherence, and Feasibility,” held on May 8, provided a timely platform for experts to discuss how Korea’s next administration can approach climate and energy challenges with wisdom and resolve.

 

The time has come for bold, yet realistic decisions grounded in both science and national context—for a truly ambitious transition.